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Abstract
The paper investigates the relationship between firms’ international cooperation strategies and 
export decision. It proposes a refinement of Melitz (2003) model of firm heterogeneity and trade 
according to which prospective exporters must engage in a cooperation agreement with a foreign 
partner in order to favour their market access and distribution activities overseas. The paper 
analyses the empirical relevance of this model by means of a new survey dataset providing in-
formation on the internationalization activities of 814 Norwegian firms in the service sectors for 
the period 2004-2006. The econometric results point out that international cooperation, both on 
existing and on innovative products, is indeed an important factor to foster the firms’ decision to 
enter the export market. 
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1. Introduction 
A recent strand of literature in international economics investigates 
the reason why firms differ in terms of their propensity to enter for-
eign markets and their ability to do so. Melitz (2003) represents one of 
the seminal papers in this new modelling literature on firm heteroge-
neity and international trade. In short, Melitz model points out that, in 
order to commercialize their products overseas, enterprises must pay a 
sunk (export) costs: since firms are characterized by different produc-
tivity levels, only high productivity enterprises will be able to make 
this investment and become exporters, whereas most other firms will 
only produce for the domestic market.1   
 
At the same time as these new theoretical ideas were being proposed, 
a large number of applied contributions have analysed the empirical 
relevance of this class of models by making use of firm-level data for 
a number of different countries. The micro-econometric literature on 
firm heterogeneity and international trade has found substantial sup-
port for the key ideas proposed by the Melitz-like models, and shown 
the great differences that characterize exporting firms vis-à-vis domes-
tic enterprises. 
 
Specifically, this applied literature has to a large extent focused on 
two main sets of factors explaining firms’ export propensity. The first 
is enterprises’ productivity, which has been shown to be much larger 
for exporters than for domestic firms by a great number of contribu-
tions (Wagner, 2007; Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007; Bernard et al., 
2007; Greenaway and Kneller, 2007; Moxnes, 2010). The second set 
of explanatory factors refers to firms’ innovative activities. The R&D 
intensity of firms and their innovative output (e.g. patents, commer-
cialization of new products) have been found to be closely related to 
the enterprises’ performance in international markets (Aw et al., 2007; 
Barrios et al., 2003; Roper and Lover, 2002; Lachenmaier and Wöb-
mann, 2006; Cassiman and Golovko, 2007; Damijan et al., 2008).  
 
Despite the great progress achieved by this recent strand of firm het-
erogeneity literature, one aspect that has not yet received proper atten-
tion is the strategy that is pursued by each firm in order to enter the 
export market. In other words, once a firm realizes to have a high 
                                                 
1  Further elaborations of this seminal idea have later been proposed by, among others, Ber-
nard et al. (2003 and 2007), Costantini and Melitz (2007) and Melitz and Ottaviano 
(2008). See also the related model developed by Ekholm and Midelfart (2005). A survey 
of these theoretical models has recently been presented by Castellacci (2011). 
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enough productivity to pay the sunk export costs, how precisely does 
it organize in order to prepare for its export activities? What strategy 
does it adopt, and what obstacles or barriers to internationalization 
does it encounter while preparing to become an exporter? 
 
Our paper intends to shed new light on these questions by focusing on 
the relationship between firms’ international cooperation strategies 
and export decision. The paper argues that international cooperation 
agreements represent an important strategy that prospective exporters 
follow in order to favour their market access and distribution activities 
overseas. Specifically, we propose a refinement of Melitz (2003) mo-
del of firm heterogeneity and trade according to which prospective 
exporters must engage in a cooperation agreement with a foreign part-
ner.  
 
The paper then analyses the empirical relevance of this model by 
means of a new survey dataset providing information on the interna-
tionalization activities of 814 Norwegian firms in the service sectors 
for the period 2004-2006. The econometric results point out that inter-
national cooperation, both on existing and on innovative products, is 
indeed an important factor to foster the firms’ decision to enter the 
export market.2  
 
The contribution proposed by the paper to the firm heterogeneity lit-
erature is twofold. First, the study sheds new lights on the export deci-
sion process and the related firm internationalization strategy, rather 
than simply assuming that these only depend on a combination of 
firm’s productivity and sunk export costs. Secondly, the paper pro-
vides new firm-level evidence on the process of internationalization in 
the service sectors, which have frequently been neglected in the previ-
ous literature due to the lack of reliable data. The paper is organized as 
follows: section 2 presents the theoretical model, section 3 the survey 
data and indicators, sections 4 and 5 the results of the empirical analy-
sis, and section 6 concludes and outlines the main results of the work. 
                                                 
2  These insights are in line with the empirical results of a few papers that have recently 
investigated the role of vertical linkages and firms’ network activities on enterprises’ ex-
port performance (Beise-Zee and Rammer, 2006; Clausen and Pohjola, 2009; Alvarez et 
al., 2009; Laursen, 2009). 
2. The model 
Our theoretical model is based on Melitz (2003) model of firm hetero-
geneity and trade, and proposes a refinement of it by pointing out the 
important role played by firms’ international cooperation strategies in 
fostering the enterprises’ export activities. The overall set up follows 
closely Melitz heterogeneity model. In each sector, firms are assumed 
to have different productivity levels: those enterprises that are below a 
given productivity threshold are not able to pay the sunk export costs 
and will therefore only produce for the domestic market; by contrast, 
above this productivity threshold, firms will be able to pay the sunk 
export costs and hence commercialize their products overseas.  
 
Based on this framework, our refinement of the Melitz model is to 
point out that those firms that are above the productivity threshold 
must engage in some type of cooperation agreement with foreign part-
ners in order to gain market access and build up a distribution network 
abroad, which are necessary for the commercialization of their prod-
ucts in international markets. Firms may either enter cooperation ag-
reements with foreign partners to favour the commercialization of ex-
isting products, or also engage in collaborations to promote and sell 
their new (innovative) products in the foreign market. The cooperation 
strategy adopted by the firm will then affect its export propensity.3 
 
In order to formalize this idea, we initially start from the same set up 
as the Melitz model. The cost function of each firm (measured in units 
of labour L) is specified as: 
 
L = f + Q/φ                                                                                         (1) 
 
where f is a fixed production cost, φ is the labour productivity of the 
enterprise, and Q/φ is its variable cost. In each market, firms face a 
demand curve where the elasticity of substitution between two goods, 
σ, is assumed constant. Hence, the firm sets a profit maximizing mark 
                                                 
3  While the idea presented here is general and may be relevant for many different industries 
of the economy, we believe it is an even more plausible hypothesis within the context of 
the service sectors, on which we focus in our empirical analysis. One relevant characteris-
tic that has previously been pointed out in the literature on services is in fact the impor-
tance of user-producer interactions for service provision and commercialisation (so-called 
customisation, see Castellacci, 2008 and 2010). In terms of firms’ international activities, 
this may imply that, in order to develop a good knowledge of the foreign market and a 
close relationship to the users’ needs, service firms may find it necessary to undertake co-
operation agreements with foreign enterprises in order to export their services overseas. 
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up σ/(σ-1) = 1/ρ, and a pricing rule P(φ) = 1/(ρφ).4 The profit of the 
firm is thus: 
 
π(φ) = R(φ) – L(φ) = R(φ)/σ – f                                                         (2) 
 
where R(φ)/σ denotes the variable profits component. The key point 
of Melitz formalization is that firms have different productivity levels, 
which are determined by the (exogenous) probability distribution g(φ). 
The firm’s profits described in equation 2 are thus a function of its 
productivity, since an enterprise with greater productivity φ can char-
ge a lower price and sell more output. Once a firm discovers its pro-
ductivity, it decides whether to produce only for the domestic market 
or whether it is also able to pay the necessary sunk costs and thus sell 
its products abroad.5 
 
At this point, we depart from Melitz model and propose our refine-
ment of it. The idea we introduce is the following. High productivity 
firms decide to enter the export market, but in order to do so they must 
do two things. First, they must pay a sunk export cost, fx. As previ-
ously observed in the literature, this is necessary in order to manage 
and overcome crucial barriers to international trade, such as regulatory 
obstacles, IPR management costs, skills and human capital require-
ments, etc. Secondly, prospective exporters must find an international 
cooperation partner in order to enhance their market access and distri-
bution channels in the foreign market. Without a cooperation partner, 
high-productivity firms will not be able to start their export activity 
because they lack the information and distribution networks that are 
necessary to initiate their commercialization activities overseas.  
 
We further assume that each firm can adopt two different cooperation 
strategies: 
 
1.  Either, it will try to sell its existing services in foreign markets by 
collaborating with an international partner. The main cooperation 
motive here is obviously market access and distribution. We call 
this strategy C (cooperation with a foreign partner). 
 
2.  Alternatively, the firm may decide not only to sell its existing ser-
vices in foreign markets, but also to sell its new (innovative) ser-
                                                 
4  As in Melitz (2003, p.1699), we here assume for simplicity that the wage rate at the nu-
merator of the pricing rule expression equals 1. 
5  Differently from Melitz, our model does not describe the case in which a firm does not 
even enter the domestic market because its low productivity does not make it possible to 
pay the fixed production costs. This is a convenient simplification that does not alter the 
model’s substance and results. In other words, we neglect the firm’s choice of whether or 
not enter the production process (analysed in Melitz, 2003, section 3), and instead focus 
on the firm’s choice between domestic versus foreign markets (as in Melitz, 2003, sec-
tions 5 and 6). 
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vices by collaborating with a foreign innovative partner. The driv-
ing cooperation motive here is not simply market access and dis-
tribution of existing products, but also the further development and 
foreign commercialization of new or improved product qualities. 
We call this strategy IC (cooperation with a foreign innovative 
partner). 
 
The cooperation strategy IC contains (and it is strictly superior to) the 
strategy C, in the sense that a firm choosing IC will enter a coopera-
tion agreement that is composed of two parts: access/distribution of 
existing services (as in C), plus the commercialization of new ser-
vices.6 
 
The prospective exporters must therefore pay the following fixed 
(sunk) costs:  
 
 fx: sunk export costs: all firms aiming at export must pay this;  
 fC: for firms choosing strategy C;  
 fC + fIC: for firms choosing strategy IC. 
 
The sunk costs of international cooperation (fC and fIC) entail the costs 
for finding a partner, managing the contractual costs and maintaining 
the contact with the partner in the future. Here we reasonably assume 
that strategy IC is more costly than C, because undertaking and man-
aging an innovation cooperation is expected to be more complex and 
demanding than an ordinary cooperation that only refers to the com-
mercialization of existing products. 
 
Prospective exporters expect the following benefits from their export-
ing activity: 
 
 RC(φ): for firms choosing strategy C. This is the additional reve-
nue that can be earned by means of a greater market access and 
distribution that is made possible by the international cooperation 
activity; 
 RC(φ) + RIC(φ): for firms choosing strategy IC. This is the addi-
tional revenue that can be earned not only by means of a greater 
market access and distribution due to the international cooperation 
activity, but also thanks to the greater commercialization of new 
services. 
 
                                                 
6  The empirical analysis of our firm-level dataset will later show the validity of the idea we 
are formalizing here. To anticipate, our data indicate that (1) nearly all exporting firms are 
engaged in some type of international cooperation; (2) enterprises adopting the strategy IC 
also cooperate on existing services (i.e. the strategy IC is stricly superior to C; in fact we 
never observe a firm that cooperates only on new services). 
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Hence, the model points out the existence of three distinct groups of 
firms: domestic (D), exporters with international cooperation (C), and 
exporters with international innovation cooperation (IC). The profits 
expected by each of these groups are: 
 
πD(φ) = R(φ)/σ – f                                                                               (3) 
 
πC(φ) = [R(φ)/σ + RC(φ)] – [f + fx + fC]                                              (4) 
πIC(φ) = [R(φ)/σ + RC(φ) + RIC(φ)] – [f + fx + fC+ fIC]                       (5) 
 
where πD(φ), πC(φ) and πIC(φ) indicate respectively the profits of do-
mestic firms (D), exporters with international cooperation (C) and ex-
porters with international innovation cooperation (IC).  
 
It is reasonable to assume that RC(φ) > fC and RIC(φ) > fIC: if a firm 
chooses strategy C (or IC), the incremental revenues RC(φ) (or RIC(φ)) 
are greater than the additional costs fC (or fIC) that it has to pay to ma-
nage the cooperation agreement. This implies that: πD(φ) < πC(φ) < 
πIC(φ). Hence, the profits expected from adopting strategy C are 
higher than D, and those earned by undertaking strategy IC are greater 
than C.  
 
Given this set up, the factors affecting the firm’s choice of adopting a 
cooperation strategy instead of another are twofold. First, the strategy 
choice will depend on the additional profits that the firm may expect 
to earn. Specifically, as pointed out in equations 3, 4 and 5, the addi-
tional profits that can be earned by entering a cooperation agreement 
with a foreign partner depend on: (1) the firm’s productivity level: the 
higher the productivity, the more likely is that the firm will decide to 
enter the export market and hence adopt cooperation strategy C or IC 
instead of D; (2) the sunk costs that must be paid to enter the foreign 
market, including both fx, fC and fIC. 
 
Secondly, the choice of the cooperation strategy will also be affected 
by the enterprise’s innovation status. Innovative firms have in fact a 
greater absorptive capacity than non-innovative enterprises, and they 
therefore have a greater awareness of the importance of cooperation 
activity, and a superior capability to interact with external actors in 
order to gain access to foreign markets and advanced external knowl-
edge. Further, if the firm has recently developed new products, the 
novelty and complexity of the latter may initially make it more diffi-
cult to introduce them in the foreign market, and hence make it neces-
sary to enter a cooperation agreement in order to favour this commer-
cialisation process. In summary: 
 
Pr{C} = s[RC(φ); fx; fC; INNO]                                                          (6) 
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Pr{IC} = t[RC(φ); RIC(φ); fx; fC; fIC; INNO]                                       (7) 
 
where Pr{C} and Pr{IC} are the probability to adopt cooperation stra-
tegy C or IC respectively, whereas INNO denotes the innovation sta-
tus of the enterprise (INNO = 1 for firms engaged in innovative activi-
ties, and 0 otherwise).7  
 
After having presented our proposed refinement of Melitz (2003) mo-
del, we follow again his formalization in order to outline the equilib-
rium condition and the main outcomes of this theoretical framework. 
Taking together the three groups of firms, each firm’s combined prof-
its may be written as: 
 
πi = πD + max {0; πC} + max {0; πIC}                                                 (8) 
 
where i = D for domestic firms, C for exporters engaged in interna-
tional cooperation, and IC for exporters engaged in international inno-
vation cooperation. Firm’s i value function is given by:8 
 
υi(φ) = max {0; πi}                                                                              (9) 
 
The cutoff productivity levels are denoted by: 
 
φ* = inf {φ: υi(φ) > 0}                                                                       (10) 
 
φX
* = inf {φ: φ ≥ φ* and πX(φ)}                                                        (11) 
 
where φ* is the cut-off productivity level for production in (at least) 
the domestic market, while φX* is the productivity threshold  for pro-
spective exporters (i.e. our C and IC firms) . These cut-off levels must 
be such that the profits that may be earned by the firm with productiv-
ity φ* (or φX*) must equal zero (the so-called zero cut-off profit condi-
tion of Melitz model): 
 
πD(φ*) = 0                                                                                          (12) 
 
πX(φX*) = 0                                                                                        (13) 
 
                                                 
7  It is important to emphasize that, according to this formalization, innovation and produc-
tivity are both exogenous variables of the model. This is due to the short-run nature of this 
theoretical framework, which for simplicity does not take into account the possibility that 
innovation and productivity may both evolve in the longer run by means of the firm’s 
R&D investments or learning effects in foreign markets. See the recent model by Costan-
tini and Melitz (2007) in which firms may increase their future productivity by investing 
in innovative activities. 
8  Equation 9, differently from Melitz model, does for simplicity assume that the probability 
that a firm exit at any period due to an exogenous shock is 0 (see Melitz, 2003, p. 1709). 
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Given these productivity thresholds, it is then possible to outline the 
distribution of productivity for incumbents (conditional upon success-
ful entry): 
 
μ(φ) = g(φ) / [1 – G(φ*)]                                                                   (14) 
 
where the term [1 – G(φ*)] represents the ex-ante probability of suc-
cessful entry in the domestic market. Therefore, the ex-ante probabil-
ity of successful entry in the foreign market is given by: 
 
Pr{X}  = [1 – G(φX*)] / [1 – G(φ*)]                                                  (15) 
 
As shown above, the productivity thresholds that appear in this ex-
pression (φX* and φ*) are determined as a function of the firms’ profits 
πi. The latter, in turn, have previously been specified as a function of 
the following main factors (see equations 3, 4 and 5): (1) the firm’s 
productivity φ; (2) the fixed production costs f, and the sunk (export 
and cooperation) costs fC and fIC; (3) the cooperation strategy adopted 
by the firm, C or IC. Therefore, the export probability Pr{X} may be 
described as a function of these factors:  
 
Pr{X}  = z[φ; f; fx; fC; fIC; C; IC]                                                      (16) 
 
Specifically, our model expects that the probability that a firm be-
comes an exporter Pr{X} is related to these factors in the following 
manner: (1) positively related to the enterprise’s productivity level; (2) 
negatively related to the fixed production and sunk (export and coop-
eration) costs; (3) to be greater for the cooperation strategy IC than for 
the strategy C (since the former leads to higher average expected prof-
its than the latter). 
 
In summary, the model leads to two main equations that will be inves-
tigated in the empirical analysis: one is the equation for the determi-
nants of the firm’s international cooperation (equations 6-7 above); 
the other is the equation for the firm’s probability to become an ex-
porter (equation 16). The empirical analysis presented in the reminder 
of the paper will first illustrate the empirical validity of some of the 
main model’s assumptions and properties, and then provide an 
econometric test of the two equations for the cooperation and export 
propensity.  
3. Data and indicators 
The Service Internationalization Survey (SIS) was carried out by the 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in the period 2008-2009. 
The motivation for undertaking the survey was to provide new empiri-
cal evidence on the main channels, strategies and patterns of interna-
tionalization followed by firms in the service industries. The data col-
lection work was based on a questionnaire that was distributed to a 
large sample of Norwegian firms. The questionnaire is composed of 
25 questions, which ask Norwegian service enterprises a number of 
information regarding their international activities in the period 2004-
2006. 
 
A web-based survey was sent to all Norwegian firms with more than 
10 employees in 14 different service industries. In total, the question-
naire was sent to a total number of 4230 enterprises and, after a series 
of reminders during the whole data collection process, 814 enterprises 
filled in the questionnaire, corresponding to a satisfactory response 
rate of 19%.  
 
The 14 selected industries represent a wide coverage of the service 
branch of the economy, and contain both sectors characterized by a 
high international propensity as well as more domestically oriented 
industries (software; research and development; other business ser-
vices; post and telecommunication; financial intermediation; insur-
ance; auxiliary financial services; hotels and restaurants; sale, mainte-
nance and repair; wholesale trade; retail trade; land transport; water 
transport; auxiliary transport services). Across the sectors, the re-
sponse rate ranges from a minimum of 11% to a maximum of 35%. 
 
The SIS questionnaire comprises a number of questions regarding the 
different delivery modes of service firms in international markets, the 
type of clients and cooperation partners that these have had, the inter-
nationalisation motives and objectives, their innovative activities, and 
the main barriers to internationalisation experienced by the enter-
prises. Our empirical analysis focuses on the following indicators 
available from the SIS survey, whose main descriptive statistics are 
reported in table 1. 
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 Export participation: dummy variable indicating whether a firm 
has had export activity in the period 2004-2006. On average, 19% 
of enterprises in our sample are an exporter.9 
 
 International cooperation: dummy variable reporting whether 
the firm has cooperated with an international partner in the period. 
These measures the strategy C in the theoretical model presented 
in the previous section. 35% of firms have had this type of coop-
eration strategy. 
 
 International innovation cooperation: dummy variable indicat-
ing whether the firm, in addition to having cooperation agreements 
on existing services, have also cooperated with an international 
partner for the commercialization of a new service. This measures 
the strategy IC of our theoretical model. On average, 14% of en-
terprises in our sample have adopted this cooperation strategy. 
 
 Part of a group: dummy variable reporting whether the firm is 
part of a group rather than an independent enterprise.  
 
 Affiliate of a foreign MNE: dummy variable indicating whether 
the firm is an affiliate of a foreign multinational enterprise. 
 
 Size (employment): number of employees. 
 
 Labour productivity: Firm’s turnover divided by the number of 
employees. This provides a measure of the productivity variable φ 
of the theoretical model. 
 
 Innovation (new services): dummy variable reporting whether the 
firm has developed a new service in the period. This indicator 
measures the variable INNO of the theoretical model. 
 
 Barriers to internationalization: this is a set of five variables in-
dicating the extent to which firms consider the following factors as 
important barriers to their internationalization activities: (1) Regu-
lation of foreign business activities; (2) Lack of qualified workers; 
(3) Protection of intellectual property rights; (4) Infrastructure 
(communication, transport, distribution); (5) Costs of building up a 
network abroad. The indicators are categorical, ranging on a scale 
from 1 ("not important") to 4 ("very important"). These five vari-
ables provide a proxy measure of the sunk costs of export and in-
                                                 
9  Notice that this variable only refers to export activities and excludes other channels of 
service internationalisation such as, for instance, FDI, foreign clients mobility and tempo-
rary presence abroad. In other words, among the four service internationalisation modes 
identified by GATS, the dummy variable used here only refers to mode 1. 
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ternational cooperation activity (i.e. the variables fx, fC, and fIC of 
our theoretical model). 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable 
 
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Export  
participation 
 
809 
 
.193 
 
.394 
 
0 
 
1 
 
International  
cooperation 
 
814 
 
.350 
 
.477 
 
0 
 
1 
 
International  
innovation cooperation 
 
814 
 
.144 
 
.351 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Part of  
a group 
 
801 
 
.518 
 
.499 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Affiliate of  
a foreign MNE 
 
764 
 
.171 
 
.377 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Size  
(employment) 
 
805 
 
68.9 
 
223.2 
 
10 
 
4861 
 
Labour  
productivity 
 
804 
 
.142 
 
.165 
 
0 
 
1.1 
 
Innovation 
(new services) 
 
814 
 
.321 
 
.467 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Barrier: Regulation of 
foreign business activi-
ties 
 
782 
 
1.65 
 
.954 
 
1 
 
4 
 
Barrier: Lack of  
qualified workers 
 
783 
 
1.74 
 
.977 
 
1 
 
4 
 
Barrier: Protection of 
intellectual property 
rights 
 
782 
 
1.44 
 
.768 
 
1 
 
4 
 
Barrier: Infrastructure 
(commun., transp., 
distrib.) 
 
782 
 
1.83 
 
1.08 
 
1 
 
4 
 
Barrier: Costs of build-
ing up a network 
abroad 
 
784 
 
2.00 
 
1.15 
 
1 
 
4 
 
 
4. Empirical analysis of the model’s 
assumptions and set up 
This section presents some descriptive evidence and statistical tests to 
illustrate the empirical validity of the main assumptions and properties 
of the theoretical model presented in section 2. The main novelty of 
our theoretical framework as compared to Melitz (2003) seminal mo-
del is the idea that all prospective exporting firms must engage in in-
ternational cooperation in order to enable their commercialization ac-
tivities overseas, and that they may do that by following two alterna-
tive strategies: cooperation to favour the commercialization of existing 
products (C) or also to facilitate the export of innovative services (IC). 
Figures 1 and 2 show that these two cooperation strategies are indeed 
important for the service firms in our sample, and closely related to 
their export propensity and innovative status. 
 
First, figure 1 reports the share of firms adopting different cooperation 
strategies and the extent to which these are related to the enterprises’ 
export activities. The figure shows that nearly all exporters in our 
sample have also had some type of international cooperation agree-
ment. This suggests that it is indeed reasonable to refine Melitz (2003) 
model by focusing on firms’ cooperation strategies, as the latter ap-
pear to be an inherent and important part of firms’ activities overseas. 
In fact, the probability that a firm is an exporter is substantially higher 
for enterprises adopting strategy IC or C vis-a-vis non-cooperating 
firms. 
 
Secondly, figure 2 shows the close relationship between the innova-
tive status of the firms (INNO) and the international cooperation strat-
egy they adopt (see equations 6 and 7 of the theoretical model). The 
diagram clearly indicates that: (1) if a firm is an innovator, it is much 
more likely that it is engaged in some type of international coopera-
tion (C or IC); (2) innovators are more likely to adopt strategy IC than 
C.  
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Figure 1: Relationship between international cooperation and export participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between international cooperation and innovation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whole sample: 
814 (100%) 
No cooperation: 
412 (51%) 
Cooperation: 
285 (35%) 
Innovation coop: 
117 (14%) 
No export: 
361 (45%) 
Export: 
51 (6%) 
No export: 
63 (8%) 
Export: 
54 (6%) 
No export: 
233 (29%) 
Export: 
52 (6%) 
Whole sample: 
814 (100%) 
Not innovators: 
553 (68%) 
Innovators: 
261 (32%) 
No cooperation: 
292 (36%) 
Cooperation: 
225 (28%) 
Cooperation: 
60 (7%) 
No cooperation: 
120 (15%) 
Innovation coop: 
36 (4%) 
Innovation coop: 
81 (10%) 
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Next, we present the results of statistical tests that compare the export 
propensity and productivity levels for the three different groups of 
firms identified by our model: non-cooperating enterprises (NC), ex-
porters with international cooperation (C), and exporters with interna-
tional innovation cooperation (IC). Table 2 presents the results of a set 
of Mann-Whitney tests and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. The former is 
a non-parametric test comparing the mean across two groups of obser-
vations, whereas the latter is a test of stochatic dominance that does 
not only focus on the mean but compares the whole distribution for 
different groups of firms.10 The comparison exercise is repeated for 
each pair of groups: C versus NC (panel a of table 2), IC against NC 
(panel b), and IC versus C (panel c). 
 
First, looking at the results for the productivity variable, we observe 
that firms with international cooperations (C) and those with innova-
tion cooperations (IC) have higher labour productivity than firms with 
no cooperation (see the table’s panels a and b respectively). These re-
sults provide empirical support for the Melitz (2003) framework and 
for our refinement of it. They show that firms are characterized by dif-
ferent productivity levels, and that these differences are particularly 
marked when comparing exporting to non-exporting firms (in terms of 
our theoretical model, this property may be expressed as: φC > φD and 
φIC > φD). This is in line with a great number of recent contributions in 
the applied literature on firm heterogeneity and trade (Wagner, 2007; 
Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007; Bernard et al., 2007; Greenaway and 
Kneller, 2007). 
 
However, the comparison of the groups IC and C (panel c of the table) 
is not statistically significant. The reason for this, according to our 
model, may be that the different strategies and performance of the 
groups C and IC are not only related to their productivity levels 
(which is for both groups above the necessary cutoff level), but they 
may also be affected by their innovation status (see equations 6 and 
7). 
 
Secondly, shifting the focus to the export participation variable, the 
test results clearly indicate that firms with international cooperations 
(C) and those with innovation cooperations (IC) have higher export 
propensity than firms with no cooperation (panels a and b). Further-
more, firms with innovation cooperations have higher export propen-
sity than firms that only have international cooperations (panel c). 
These results are in line with our model’s prediction (see equation 16) 
that the probability to become an exporter is not only related to the 
                                                 
10  In the recent applied literature on firm heterogeneity and exports, analogous tests have 
been used by, among others, Cassiman and Golovko (2007) and Damijan et al. (2008). 
See in particular the related firm-level evidence on Norwegian manufacturing firms re-
cently presented by Moxnes (2010). 
Firm Heterogeneity, International Cooperations and Export Participation 19 
factors previously pointed out in the literature, productivity and sunk 
costs, but it is also affected by the firm’s cooperation strategy.  
 
In summary, the results presented in this section illustrate the empiri-
cal validity of our model’s main assumptions and set up. Our sample 
is well described by distinguishing three groups of firms: domestic 
enterprises (D), exporters with international cooperation (C) and ex-
porters with innovation cooperation (IC). Firms in the first group are 
not able to enter the export market because their productivity level is 
below the minimum cutoff level (as in Melitz model). On the other 
hand, the last two groups are both above the threshold productivity 
level, but must engage in a cooperation agreement with a foreign part-
ner in order to enter the export market. These two groups differ how-
ever in terms of the cooperation strategy they adopt. Firms in the IC 
group are more likely to be innovators than enterprises in the C group, 
and have therefore on average a higher export propensity.  
 
Table 2: Differences in export propensity and labour productivity 
according to firms’ cooperation strategies 
 
a. International cooperation (C) versus no cooperation (NC) 
          Mann-Whitney test   
      Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test  
 z-score Probability{C>NC} D-stat P-value 
Export  
participation 9.46*** 0.362 0.27 0.000 
Labour pro-
ductivity 
4.41*** 
 
0.398 
 
0.20 
 
0.000 
 
 
b. International innovation cooperation (IC) versus no cooperation 
(NC) 
          Mann-Whitney test    
      Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test  
 z-score Probability{IC>NC} D-stat P-value 
Export par-
ticipation 8.11*** 0.339 0.32 0.000 
Labour pro-
ductivity 
3.54*** 
 
0.395 
 
0.21 
 
0.000 
 
 
c. International innovation cooperation (IC) versus international coop-
eration (C) 
    Mann-Whitney test   
      Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test  
 z-score Probability{IC>C} D-stat P-value 
Export  
participation 2.87** 0.416 0.16 0.031 
Labour pro-
ductivity 
1.25 
 
0.455 
 
0.11 
 
0.325 
 
 
Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%
5. Empirical analysis of the model’s 
outcomes 
As outlined at the end of section 2, our theoretical model leads to two 
main equations, which are empirically investigated in the regression 
analysis presented in this section. One is the equation for the determi-
nants of the firm’s international cooperation strategy (see equations 6-
7 in section 2); the other is the equation for the firm’s probability to 
become an exporter (see equation 16). The empirical version of these 
two equations that will be considered here is the following: 
 
  Pr{CSi} = α + β φi + γ SCi + δ INNOi + κ FSi + ε1i                       (17) 
 
  Pr{Xi} = η + θ φi + λ SCi + ω CSi + ξ FSi ε2i                                 (18) 
 
 
where the variables are defined as follows: 
 
 Pr{CSi} is the probability that firm i adopts a given cooperation 
strategy. CSi equals C if the firm has international cooperation 
only, and IC if the firm has also innovation cooperation; 
 Pr{Xi} is the probability that firm i is an exporter; 
 φi is the enterprise’s labour productivity;  
 SCi denotes the sunk (export and cooperation) costs (i.e. the vari-
ables fx, fC, fIC of the theoretical model). These are measured 
through the set of barriers to internationalization variables that 
have been defined in section 3; 
 INNOi represents the innovation status of the firm (it equals 1 for 
innovators, and 0 otherwise); 
 FSi is a set of firm-specific control variables (firm size; whether it 
is part of a group; and whether it is the affiliate of a foreign MNE).  
 
Taken together, equations 17 and 18 constitute a recursive system of 
equations, since the dependent variable in the first equation Pr{CSi} 
appears on the right-hand-side of the second equation. We use two 
different econometric approaches to estimate these equations. The first 
is to estimate the two equations independently from each other by 
means of an ordinary probit model. This approach neglects the en-
dogeneity of the CSi variable in equation 18 and it is therefore likely 
to provide biased estimates. It is however useful to present these pro-
bit results as a benchmark. The second econometric approach makes 
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use of a recursive bivariate probit model, in which both equations are 
simultaneously estimated and the endogeneity of the CSi variable is 
properly handled by the way the model is estimated.11 
 
Before presenting the econometric results, it is important to point out 
two simplifying assumptions, and possible limitations, of our empiri-
cal model. First, in line with Melitz (2003) model and our refinement 
of it, the productivity variable φi is assumed to be an exogenous fac-
tor, which firms take as given when they decide upon their coopera-
tion and export strategies. Given the static nature of our theoretical 
model and the cross-sectional nature of the survey data we are using, 
our empirical analysis is not able to take into account the possible en-
dogeneity of the productivity variable in a longer time frame. Never-
theless, a large number of micro econometric studies have previously 
investigated the possible feedback effect linking firms’ international 
activities to their productivity dynamics, and often failed to find ro-
bust support for the learning-by-exporting hypothesis (Wagner, 2007; 
Andersson and Loof, 2009). We therefore consider it reasonable to 
neglect this feedback effect in the context of our cross-sectional inves-
tigation. 
 
Secondly, our model also assumes that the innovation status of the 
firm (INNOi, the dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm is 
an innovator) is an exogenous factor in equation 17. Similarly to the 
productivity variable, this is justified in the context of our static theo-
retical model and cross-sectional nature of the data at hand. The un-
derlying idea is that, in any given period, an enterprise’s cooperation 
strategy will not affect its innovation status, because the latter is the 
result of choices and investments that the firm did in the past (e.g. to 
set up an R&D lab) and that cannot be affected and modified in the 
short run. However, this argument would certainly be less appropriate 
if we had the possibility to analyse a dynamic model by means of pa-
nel data, since in this case it would be reasonable to also investigate a 
possible feedback mechanism linking firms’ international cooperation 
strategies to their innovation activities. Finally, it is also important to 
notice the exclusion restriction that we introduce in order to identify 
the recursive bivariate probit model: the (exogenous) INNO variable 
enters equation 17 but is not included in equation 18. In other words, 
in line with our theoretical model, the econometric specification as-
sumes that the innovation status of the firm affects the probability that 
this decides to collaborate with a foreign partner, but does not have 
                                                 
11  The recursive bivariate probit is a seemingly unrelated regression model with correlated 
disturbances, in which the dependent variable of the first equation appears on the righ-
hand-side of the second equation. The model is estimated by MLE. Greene (2003, section 
21.6.6, pp. 715-716) points out that in such a model the endogeneity of one of the RHS 
variables of the second equation can be neglected because this term does not affect the 
maximization of the log-likelihood (differently from what it would be the case in a linear 
recursive model not estimated by MLE).  
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any direct effect on the probability that the enterprise is an exporter. 
Therefore, the firm’s innovation status is assumed to have an indirect 
effect on its export propensity through the impacts it has on the coop-
eration strategy choice. 
 
The econometric results are presented in tables 3 and 4. Table 3 re-
ports the results for equation 17, and table 4 for equation 18. The first 
two columns of each table focus on the cooperation strategy C (inter-
national cooperation), whereas the other two focus on the strategy IC 
(international innovation cooperation). The numbers of the various 
columns indicate the econometric approach used in each case, namely 
ordinary probit (1.1 and 1.3; 2.1 and 2.3) and recursive bivariate pro-
bit (1.2 and 1.4; 2.2 and 2.4).12 
 
Let us first look at the results for equation 17 reported in table 3. The 
labour productivity variable is positively and significantly related to 
both dependent variables, international cooperation (C) and innovation 
cooperation (IC), and its coefficient is stable across the regressions. 
The innovation dummy variable is also positive and significant. Its 
estimated coefficient illustrates the strong impact that innovation has 
on the choice of firms to engage in international cooperation activities 
(strategy C or IC). Besides, as pointed out in our theoretical frame-
work, the firm’s innovation status has a stronger effect on the prob-
ability that an enterprise adopts strategy IC rather than C (compare 
columns 1.1 to 1.3, and 1.2 to 1.4).   
 
Among the barriers to internationalization variables, three of them 
turn out to have significant estimates: the protection of IPRs, which is 
a particularly relevant issue for service provision in international mar-
kets; the lack of infrastructures in the foreign market; and the costs of 
building up a network abroad (this variable is only significant for the 
dependent variable IC, though; see right-hand-side of table 3). Notice 
that these barriers variables are all positively related to the dependent 
variable. Our interpretation of these results, in line with analogous 
survey data exercises, is that firms which are more actively engaged in 
international markets are more likely to attach higher importance to 
these hampering factors, because they are more aware and have a bet-
ter knowledge of the sunk costs that it is necessary to pay in order to 
enter the export market. 
 
Last, looking at the firm-specific control variables, the size of the en-
terprise and the foreign affiliate dummy indicator are both positively 
and significantly related to the enterprise’s decision to engage in an 
                                                 
12  The LR tests reported at the bottom of tables 3 and 4 indicate that the hypothesis that the 
disturbances of the two equations are uncorrelated can be rejected. This supports the 
choice of estimating a bivariate version of the model instead of two separate probit mod-
els for the two equations.  
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international cooperation agreement. By contrast, the part of a group 
dummy variable is not significant at conventional levels. It is impor-
tant to control for this factor in equation 17, since this suggests that 
the choice of a firm to cooperate with an international partner is not 
mainly driven by the fact that the enterprise is part of a group (and 
hence connected to other firms within an already established con-
glomerate).13  
 
Table 4 shifts the focus to the results for equation 18, where the de-
pendent variable is the export participation dummy indicator. The 
most important explanatory variable in this equation turns out to be 
the international cooperation strategy, namely C in columns 2.1 and 
2.2, and IC in columns 2.3 and 2.4. The international cooperation va-
riable is highly significant in all the regressions, and its estimated im-
pact on the export propensity increases substantially when the en-
dogeneity of this variable is taken into account by means of the recur-
sive bivariate probit model.14  
 
The labour productivity variable and the firm size (employment) con-
trol variable are also positively related to the export participation 
dummy, as previously found in the literature (Wagner, 2007; Mayer 
and Ottaviano, 2007; Bernard et al., 2007; Greenaway and Kneller, 
2007; Altomonte and Colantone, 2008; Castellani and Giovannetti, 
2010). However, the statistical precision of these results is somewhat 
lower than in previous papers in the firm heterogeneity applied litera-
ture. This is likely due to the fact that in our approach, besides the di-
rect effect of productivity and firm size on export propensity, we also 
consider an indirect effect, since these two firm-specific variables are 
assumed to affect the firm’s cooperation strategy first (equation 17), 
and the latter does then have an impact on the enterprise’s export pro-
pensity (equation 18). Our econometric results suggest it may be diffi-
cult to obtain a precise estimate of these two distinct effects of produc-
tivity and firm size on export participation. 
 
                                                 
13  In additional regressions not reported in table 3, we have also estimated equation 17 by 
adding the export propensity (dummy) variable to the set of regressors, in order to control 
for the possibility of a feedback effect from firm’s export participation to their interna-
tional cooperation strategy (i.e. firms may be more likely to enter new cooperation agree-
ments if they are already present in, and have knowledge of, the foreign market). This 
feedback effect is not present in our theoretical (static) model, but it would be a plausible 
extension in the context of a dynamic model. This export-cooperation feedback effect 
turns out to be positive and significant in these additional regressions, and its inclusion 
does not alter any of the results for the other variables in equation 17. 
14  In another set of regressions not reported here, instead of using separately the two regres-
sors C and IC, we have made use of the variable “Cooperation_strategy”, which combines 
C and IC together. This is a categorical variable taking three values: 0 for non-cooperating 
firms, 1 for firms adopting strategy C and 2 for IC enterprises. The results of these regres-
sions are basically the same as those reported in table 4 here, but provide an additional 
relevant indication: the positive and significant estimate for the variable “Coopera-
tion_strategy” confirms our theoretical model’s prediction that the probability to become 
an exporter is higher for firms adopting strategy IC than C (see equation 16 in section 2). 
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Some of the barriers to internationalization variables turn out to be 
important for the export decision of enterprises: the regulation of 
business activities in foreign markets, the lack of qualified workers 
and the protection of IPRs. By contrast, the two variables measuring 
the lack of infrastructures in the foreign market and the costs of build-
ing up a network abroad do not turn out to have significant estimates, 
differently from it was the case in the results for equation 17. It is 
therefore interesting to observe that, among our set of barriers to in-
ternationalization variables, those measuring natural barriers (related 
to infrastructures and network building factors) are important for the 
firm’s choice of what cooperation strategy to adopt, whereas those 
measuring policy-imposed costs (e.g. regulatory factors) are more rele-
vant for its export decision.  
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Table 3: Regression results for the first equation. Dependent vari-
ables: International cooperation (C) and international innovation 
cooperation (IC) 
 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 
 Probit 
 
Recursive 
bivariate 
probit 
 
Probit 
Recursive 
bivariate 
probit 
Dependent vari-
able  
C 
 
C 
 
IC 
 
IC 
 
Labour  
productivity (log) 
 
0.402 
(5.09)*** 
 
0.394 
(4.99)*** 
 
0.401 
(3.84)*** 
 
0.353 
(3.39)*** 
 
Innovation 
(new services) 
 
0.611 
(4.75)*** 
 
0.688 
(5.50)*** 
 
0.816 
(5.49)*** 
 
0.924 
(6.25)*** 
 
Barrier: Business  
regulation  
 
0.071 
(0.91) 
 
0.073 
(0.93) 
 
-0.106 
(1.15) 
 
-0.085 
(0.92) 
 
Barrier: Lack of  
qualified workers 
 
-0.052 
(0.65) 
 
-0.048 
(0.59) 
 
0.047 
(0.51) 
 
0.039 
(0.42) 
 
Barrier: IPR  
protection  
 
0.187 
(1.96)** 
 
0.203 
(2.10)** 
 
0.183 
(1.84)* 
 
0.181 
(1.78)* 
 
Barrier: Lack of 
infrastructure  
 
0.198 
(2.76)*** 
 
0.184 
(2.53)** 
 
0.186 
(2.29)** 
 
0.158 
(1.93)* 
 
Barrier: Costs of 
building up a 
network abroad 
 
0.090 
(1.24) 
 
0.083 
(1.14) 
 
0.184 
(2.16)** 
 
0.187 
(2.20)** 
 
Employment  
(log) 
 
0.286 
(3.22)*** 
 
0.280 
(3.16)*** 
 
0.303 
(2.67)*** 
 
0.215 
(1.85)* 
 
Part of  
a group 
 
0.180 
(1.34) 
 
0.143 
(1.10) 
 
-0.073 
(0.44) 
 
-0.088 
(0.53) 
 
Affiliate of  
a foreign MNE 
 
0.488 
(2.91)*** 
 
0.462 
(2.78)*** 
 
0.331 
(1.67)* 
 
0.366 
(1.88)* 
 
(Pseudo) R-
squared 
 
0.219 - 0.273 - 
LR test  
of exogeneity - 5.79** - 5.12** 
 
Observations 
 
607 604 595 604 
 
All regressions include a constant and industry dummies. Significance levels: *** 
1%; ** 5%; * 10%. 
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Table 4: Regression results for the second equation. Dependent 
variable: Export participation  
 
 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 
 
 
 
Probit 
 
Recursive biva-
riate probit 
 
Probit Recursive  bivariate probit 
International  
cooperation 
 
0.795 
(5.61)*** 
 
1.543 
(5.75)*** 
 
  
International  
innovation cooperation 
 
  
0.718 
(4.55)*** 
 
1.446 
(4.81)*** 
 
Labour  
productivity (log) 
 
0.243 
(2.58)** 
 
0.077 
(0.75) 
 
0.286 
(3.09)*** 
 
0.170 
(1.75)* 
 
Barrier: Business  
regulation  
 
0.110 
(1.39) 
 
0.092 
(1.15) 
 
0.139 
(1.74)* 
 
0.155 
(1.92)* 
 
Barrier: Lack of  
qualified workers 
 
0.135 
(1.64) 
 
0.184 
(2.23)** 
 
0.095 
(1.17) 
 
0.139 
(1.69)* 
 
Barrier: IPR  
protection  
 
0.197 
(2.13)** 
 
0.167 
(1.74)* 
 
0.212 
(2.32)** 
 
0.202 
(2.13)** 
 
Barrier: Lack of infra-
structure  
 
0.047 
(0.64) 
 
-0.061 
(0.79) 
 
0.058 
(0.81) 
 
-0.024 
(0.32) 
 
Barrier: Costs of building 
up a network abroad 
 
0.097 
(1.24) 
 
0.047 
(0.60) 
 
0.104 
(1.35) 
 
0.048 
(0.60) 
 
Employment  
(log) 
 
0.192 
(1.93)* 
 
0.038 
(0.36) 
 
0.249 
(2.59)** 
 
0.145 
(1.42) 
 
 
(Pseudo) R-squared 
 
0.243 - 0.225 - 
LR test  
of exogeneity - 5.79** - 5.12** 
 
Observations 
 
652 604 652 604 
 
All regressions include a constant and industry dummies. Significance levels: *** 
1%; ** 5%; * 10%. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
The paper has investigated the role of international cooperations for 
firms’ export decisions. The theoretical framework (section 2) has put 
forward a refinement of Melitz model of firm heterogeneity and trade. 
The main idea we have introduced within the standard heterogeneity 
model is that an enterprise, once it realizes that its productivity is 
above a minimum cutoff level that is required to enter the export mar-
ket, must not only pay the sunk export costs as previously pointed out 
in the literature, but it must also engage in a cooperation agreement 
with a foreign partner in order to favour its market access and distribu-
tion activities overseas. Specifically, our model argues that a prospec-
tive exporter can adopt two alternative international cooperation 
strategies: cooperation for the commercialization of existing products 
only, or also for the further development and commercialization of 
innovative (new) products. Such a cooperation strategy is one key fac-
tor affecting the export propensity of firms (in addition to the other 
factors previously pointed out in the literature such as productivity, 
firm size and sunk export costs). 
 
The paper has then investigated the empirical relevance of this theo-
retical framework by means of a new survey dataset providing infor-
mation on the internationalization activities of 814 Norwegian firms in 
the service sectors for the period 2004-2006. After a brief description 
of the data and indicators (section 3), the empirical analysis has shown 
that the model’s set up and main properties closely resemble the char-
acteristics of our firm-level sample (section 4). Our sample is well de-
scribed by distinguishing three groups of firms: domestic enterprises 
(D), exporters with international cooperation (C) and exporters with 
innovation cooperation (IC). Firms in the first group are not able to 
enter the export market because their productivity level is below the 
minimum cutoff level (as in Melitz model). On the other hand, the last 
two groups are much more productive than domestic firms and have 
of course a greater export propensity. However, in order to enter the 
export market, they must engage in a cooperation agreement with a 
foreign partner. Nearly all of the exporters in our sample, in fact, are 
also engaged in international cooperation agreements with foreign en-
terprises.  
 
We have then shown the empirical relevance of these model’s proper-
ties in a multivariate setting by estimating two equations, one for the 
firm’s cooperation decision and the other for its export propensity 
(section 5). The regression results point out three interesting results. 
First, international cooperation, both on existing and on innovative 
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products, is indeed an important strategy to foster the firms’ decision 
to enter the export market. Secondly, differently from the previous 
literature on innovation and export, in our model innovation does not 
have a direct effect on the export decision but only an indirect impact, 
i.e. by affecting the firm’s choice of whether to engage in an interna-
tional cooperation and of which cooperation strategy to adopt. Finally, 
the results for the barriers to internationalization variables, which rep-
resent our set of proxy measures for sunk costs, point out that those 
variables measuring natural barriers (related to infrastructures and 
network building factors) are important for the firm’s choice of what 
cooperation strategy to adopt, whereas those measuring policy-
imposed costs (e.g. regulatory factors) are more relevant for its export 
decision. The only barrier variable that turns out to be important for 
both the cooperation and export decision is the protection of IPRs, 
which is indeed a particularly relevant obstacle for the provision of 
services in international markets. 
 
These results on the role of international cooperation as a complemen-
tary strategy to foster firms’ export participation open up new oppor-
tunities for future research in this field. One important limitation of 
this paper, in particular, needs to be addressed by future research. Due 
to the short-run nature of our theoretical model and the cross-sectional 
data we have used in the empirical analysis, we have assumed 
throughout the work that innovation and productivity are both exoge-
nous variables in the model. While this is a reasonable asumption in 
the context of a short-run model and cross-sectional investigation, it is 
clear that these variables are endogenous factors in a longer time fra-
me. The challenge ahead is therefore to refine the main idea presented 
in this paper by means of a dynamic model framework in which both 
innovation and productivity may in turn be affected by the firm’s co-
operation and export activities, and to test the empirical relevance of 
the various feedback mechanisms by means of a panel dataset. 
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